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SUMMARY  
 
GRID is a Coordination Action funded under the Trust and Security objective of the IST Programme of the 6th 
Framework to achieve consensus at the European level on the key issues involved by power systems 
vulnerabilities, in view of the challenges driven by the transformation of the European power infrastructure and 
ICT integration. GRID wants to assess the needs of the EU power sector on these issues, so as to establish a 
Roadmap for collaborative research in this area.  
The present report provides a survey on current efforts somewhat related to the objectives of GRID. Similar to 
GRID, a number of European and US endeavours have attempted in recent years to draw a Road Map so as to 
coordinate efforts concerning energy transport/distribution research and CIP. Five of these Road Mapping 
projects appear related to GRID: 
- the US-Canada Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Energy Sector, resulting from collaborative 
work between governments (sponsoring the activity) and industry with an active involvement and 
leadership of energy asset owners and operators;  
- CI2RCO, a Co-ordination Action co-funded under the IST priority of the 6th Framework. CI2RCO 
established a European taskforce to encourage a co-ordinated approach for research and development 
on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection; 
- SmartGrids, a European Technology Platform involving industrial stakeholders, conceived by DG 
Research with the support of FP 5 and 6 research clusters. SmartGrids is to formulate a vision for the 
development of Europe’s electricity networks looking towards 2020 and beyond, in view of the main 
drivers of the power sector. 
- RELIANCE, a coordination action among European Transmission System Operators, utilities and energy 
research, aimed at establishing collectively a research roadmap and assessing its implementation risks. 
- ERMINE, a coordination action whose objective is to provide the recent and present scenario of the 
electricity Research and Technology Development (RTD) efforts in Europe (map), as well as to indicate 
specific RTD needs of the European electricity sector in the next 20-25 years (road map). 
In addition to the above, there are many specific EU and national research projects pertaining to the area of 
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP). This report provides a summary of the survey made in 2006 
within GRID by A.Z. Morch [20]. Moreover the report provides an overview of current standardisation activities in 
the area, based on a previous survey by some of the authors [21]. Recent and current EU and national projects in 
the area are assessed in order to establish their relevance to the objectives of GRID – more specifically the ones 
identified within the recently delivered draft GRID Road Map.  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
EU power systems are undergoing an in-depth restructuring so as to cope with the enlargement, open access and 
the progressive integration of the EU electricity market and intensification of cross border trade. Emergent control 
technologies, like wide area monitoring and adaptive controls, appear to be potentially useful for dealing with the 
new situation especially regarding monitoring. But their full application will demand a new approach to the design 
and system operation. Indeed, their integration within existing control infrastructures and practices is a real 
challenge. These factors contribute to increase power system vulnerabilities, in a worldwide scenario where 
malicious threats against large and complex infrastructures are intensifying.  
Since the inception of the issue in the early nineties, several CIP related efforts have tried to provide general 
frameworks for investments to protect critical national infrastructures. Some of these endeavours took the 
approach of Road Maps, i.e. broad and far sighted plans to increase infrastructure resilience, identifying mid and 
long term objectives (10-20 years) and relevant measures. Aside measures to strengthen the physical and cyber 
robustness of CIP based on available technology, these Road Maps included generic and specific R&D efforts to 
improve infrastructure dependability, resilience and survivability. This report provides a survey of the most recent 
and contemporary road mapping efforts in Europe and the US somewhat concerned with critical infrastructure 
protection. Recent and current EU and national projects in the area are also assessed in order to establish their 
relevance to the objectives of GRID – more specifically the ones identified within the recently delivered draft GRID 
Road Map. Recent and current EU and national projects in the area are also assessed in order to establish their 
relevance to the objectives of GRID, and a gap analysis is attempted. 
1.1 The US-Canada Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Energy Sector  
The US-Canada Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Energy Sector (USCR) 
[www.controlsystemsroadmap.net/] was issued in January 2006 as a result of a collaborative work between 
governments (sponsoring the activity) and industry with an active involvement and leadership of energy asset 
owners and operators. A distinctive feature of this collaborative effort is the active involvement and leadership of 
energy asset owners and operators in developing the Roadmap content and priorities. The Roadmap synthesizes 
expert input from the control systems community, including owners and operators, commercial vendors, national 
laboratories, industry associations, and government agencies. The Roadmap project was funded and facilitated 
by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability in collaboration with the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate and the Energy Infrastructure 
Protection Division of Natural Resources Canada. Aimed at improving the power system cyber security through a 
coherent plan to be used by industry and government as a template for action, the Project purposes were to 
define a consensus on needs, produce a comprehensive plan and guide efforts by industry, academia and 
government within the next ten years. 
The US map covers the whole energy sector (including electricity, oil and gas infrastructures) with a limited 
reference to distributed generation, addresses issues related to both legacy upgrades and new generation 
designs by identifying relevant activities spanning over R&D, testing, best practices, training and education, 
policies, standards and protocols, information sharing. 
The vision expressed in the US map is that “in 10 years, control systems for critical applications will be designed, 
installed, operated, and maintained to survive an intentional cyber assault with no loss of critical function”. 
The US road map contains a structured set of priorities that address specific control systems needs within the 
next 10 years. The following four pillars have been distinguished to reach the envisioned objective: 
• Measure and assess security posture 
• Develop and integrate protective measures 
• Detect intrusion and implement response strategies 
• Sustain security improvements. 
 
Per each of the pillars above a strategy has been developed and illustrated by means of a table including 
challenges, near- mid- and long-term milestones and priorities where priorities are associated to the following 
needs: 
• Identifying strategic risks 
• Legacy systems 
• Security tools and practices 
• New Control system architecture. 
 
Finally the US road map outlines the main implementation steps that will result in a industry-managed process for 
guiding and aligning existing efforts, addressing critical needs and gaps, launching control systems projects, 
coordinating and managing the roadmap project. 
The US Road Map is the closer in scope to the GRID one among those considered in this review. However there 
are important differences pertaining sponsorship, participants, scope, aim, purpose and timeframe in between the 
two Road Maps:  
• Sponsorship:   
o USCR is directly sponsored by the US and Canada governments in a joint effort,  
o GRID is partly funded by the Commission through the EU framework R&D programme.  
• Participants:  
o USCR is a collaborative work between industry and government with active involvement and 
leadership of energy asset owners and operators.  
o GRID is lead by its research partners, and performs consultation actions toward the industry. 
Member state governments are not directly involved. Stakeholders are directly involved in an 
advisory role, through the Stakeholders Advisory Board.  
• Scope:  
o USCR i) covers the whole energy sector ii) addresses both legacy upgrades and new generation 
designs iii) includes activities of R&D, testing, best practices, training and education, policies, 
standards and protocols, information sharing iv) makes limited reference to distributed 
generation. 
o GRID i) covers the electricity domain only (no oil and gas) ii) stresses on legacy updates more 
than new generation designs  iii) mostly focuses on R&D activities iv) stresses on the impact of 
distributed generation on control architectures. 
• Aim:  
o USCR is aimed at improving cyber security through a coherent plan to be used by industry and 
government as a template for action.  
o GRID is aimed at improving cyber security through a research roadmap which by its nature may 
impact on cyber security in an indirect way and in a longer term.  
• Purpose: although both maps are comprehensive plans based on consensus, the USCR aspires to guide 
coordinated efforts by industry, academia and the national governments involved.  
• Timeframe: in accordance with their different aim and scope, the two Road Maps have a different time 
frame: - USCR: 10 years (2005-2015) - GRID: 15 years (2007-2022). 
 
1.2 The Critical Information Infrastructure Research Co-ordination project (CI2RCO) 
The Critical Information Infrastructure Research Co-ordination (CI2RCO) project [www.ci2rco.org], a two-year 
project which started in 2005, was a so called Co-ordination Action co-funded under the Information Society 
Technologies (IST) Priority of the 6th Framework Programme by the European Commission. The project 
addressed the creation and co-ordination of a European taskforce to encourage a co-ordinated approach for 
research and development on CIIP. The main objective of the CI2RCO project was thus to create and co-ordinate 
a European Taskforce: 
- to encourage a co-ordinated Europe-wide approach for research and development on Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection, 
- to establish a European Research Area (ERA) on CIIP as part of the larger IST strategic objective to 
integrate and strengthen the ERA on dependability and security, and 
- to support CIIP awareness and actions in the former EU-25, Associate Candidate Countries (ACC)2 as 
well as the EU Associated States (Norway, Switzerland, and Israel). 
Though the project also produced a gap analysis of existing CIIP R&D programmes at regional, national an EU 
level, which was done in cooperation with the R&D community and the stakeholders (including electric power 
production and distribution), its major goal was to establish a European CIIP R&D Agenda, and the project didn’t 
focus on sector-specific gaps or needs, but on cross-sector CIIP issues. So the findings and recommendations of 
CI2RCO are a valuable background when you consider how to make the GRID roadmap happen, and many of 
the general results of CI2RCO can be supported from the in-depth experience in the closer GRID sector, but in 
practice there is little overlapping. 
1.3 The European Technology Platform for the Electricity Networks of the Future (SmartGrids) 
SmartGrids [www.smartgrids.eu/] is a European initiative involving industrial stakeholders, organised as a so-
called Technology Platform. The initial concept and guiding principles of the Technology Platform were developed 
by the European Commission Directorate General for Research, with the support of research clusters within FP 5 
and 6. SmartGrids began its work in 2005. Its aim is to formulate and promote a vision for the development of 
Europe’s electricity networks looking towards 2020 and beyond, in view of the main drivers of the power sector:  
• to support the EU environmental policy  
• to provide response  to the growing demand for electricity in a landscape where European energy 
markets are liberalized  
• to cope with the increasing role of distributed generation and ensure interoperability of European 
electricity networks 
 
Its main objectives are:  
• to develop a shared vision for the future which encourages the engagement of multiple, independent 
parties  
• to identify research needs and build support for an increased public and private research effort on 
electricity networks 
• to align ongoing RTD projects and new European, national and regional programmes on electricity 
transmission and distribution systems  
• to draw conclusions and recommendations for follow-up actions and implementation of the strategic 
research agenda and deployment plan. 
 
The platform is organized so as to be open and accessible, allowing the participation of all active stakeholders, 
and to be user-centric. It is steered and monitored by an Advisory Council (AC), nominated in May 2005, which 
provided guidance on the definition, initiation and putting in place of the structure, procedures and work 
programme. The AC set up an Executive Group which proposed the initiatives that led the Platform in its initial 
steps. Now the operational structure of the platform is based on the Mirror Group, whose current members 
include representatives from 19 countries, thus enabling the involvement of EU Member States, candidate 
countries and associate countries. 
SmartGrids has achieved a shared Vision, whose main elements are: 
• sustainability, competition, security of supply 
• flexibility: fulfill customers needs 
• accessibility to all network users, particularly RES and high efficiency DG with zero or low CO2 emissions 
• reliability: assuring and improving Quality of Supply and be resilient to hazards and uncertainties 
• economics: best value through innovation, efficient energy management, level the playing field, 
encourage competition while coping with EU and national market regulations 
 
in a landscape where key future requirements are: 
• customers are part of the “network-loop”, both producer and consumer = “prosumer” 
• utilities must provide real-time price information (smart meters) 
• regulators must provide adequate investment and reward incentives 
• the system will have to integrate millions small scale generators 
• bulk power and small scale generators must coexist 
• demand and supply balancing solutions are required 
 
These requirements demand for a Future Network Vision whose key concepts are: 
• Microgrids: LV networks with DG sources, local storage, controllable loads, automatic islanding 
• Virtual Utilities: to configure distributed generation resources and deliver differentiated power quality at 
the connection point 
• Internet model: the customer must be in control 
 
The SmartGrids Research Area (SRA) includes five main areas: 
1) Smart Distribution Infrastructure (Small Customers & Network Design) 
2) Smart Operation, Energy Flows & Customer Adaptation (Small Customers & Networks) 
3) SmartGrid Assets and Asset Management (T&D) 
4) European Interoperability of SmartGrids (T&D) 
5) Smart Grids Cross-Cutting Issues and Catalysts 
 
Within the SRA landscape three specific research themes, RT 3.2: Transmission networks of the future: new 
architectures & new tools, RT 4.3. Architectures and tools for operations, restorations & defence plans, 
and RT5.2, The networks of the future –Information and Communication, appear to be more specifically 
concerned with issues related to ICT vulnerability.  
 
1.4 The RELIANCE action 
“CooRdination perspectives of the European transmission network research activities to optimise the reLIAbility of 
power supply, usiNg a systemiC approach, involving growing distributed generation and renewable energy 
markEts” - in short RELIANCE – is a coordination action elaborated by eight European Transmission System 
Operators (TSO), one Power Producer, one Distribution System Operator (DSO) and several Research Centres 
(www.ca-reliance.org). 
One of the objectives of the project was to design collectively a research roadmap and assess its implementation 
risks. This research roadmap, towards a European Transmission System, targets the time horizon of 2030. 
According to www.ca-reliance.org, the RELIANCE roadmap is pictured in 9 domains. 
 
 
Figure 1 The Reliance Road Map [Source : Reliance presentation to Commission, www.ca-reliance.org]  
 
Each of these nine boxes has been developed into a fully elaborated set of objectives, which will be released at 
the project’s final conference in Ljubljana (21/9/2007). This roadmap has been refined over time as in the 
following figure. 
 
Figure 2 The Reliance areas of interest [Source : Reliance presentation to Commission, www.ca-reliance.org]  
 
While the focus of the Reliance roadmap is related to many different aspects (including economic ones) of the 
transmission systems of the future, several elements from the Reliance roadmap are very parallel to the Grid 
roadmap. Some examples include : 
- simulation and analysis tools 
- addressing occurrences of multi-contingencies 
- methods for monitoring critical architectures 
- improved cyber security 
- new architectures for distribution grids 
- autonomous microgrids 
 
1.5 Electricity Research Road Map In Europe (ERMINE) 
The ERMInE project (http://www.ermine.cesiricerca.it) is a co-ordination action supported by the European 
Commission under the 6th R&D Framework Programme. The general objective of ERMInE is to provide the recent 
and present scenario of the electricity Research and Technology Development (RTD) efforts in Europe as well as 
to indicate specific RTD needs of the European electricity sector in the next 20-25 years. The main project 
activities are: 
• Collection of data on the structure and characteristics of the existing electricity system of each European 
country 
• Collection of data on RTD efforts (subjects, funding, performers …) in the recent and present electricity 
sector of EU25 
• Collection of data on foreseen trends of RTD priorities and efforts for the electricity sector of EU25 in the 
next 20-25 years 
• Definition of a Map (present situation of electricity RTD in Europe) and a Roadmap (possibilities of 
evolution of the electricity sector), according to the collected information 
  
These activities are carried out by means of questionnaires, interviews, workshops, focused meetings and 
symposia, addressed to European public regulators, utilities/companies, equipment manufacturers, network 
operators, research institutes and associations. 
The overall resulting data are collected in a digital databank, organised in national sections, and can be analysed 
according to appropriate selection and filtering criteria. 
 
2 EUROPEAN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
 
The following chapter gives a brief description of European R&D projects related to the CIIP-area1. Recent EU 
Networks of Excellence and Platforms are not included in this survey, because they were overviewed in Chapter 
2. Hence the chapter includes two sections:  
• Generic projects – projects addressing general ICT security issues as for examples cryptography, 
security in data communication, operation systems (OS) etc.  
• Applied projects – projects addressing concrete security issues in the Power Industry  
 
The overall scale of the CIIP-related research in the EU was reinforced after initiation of Information Society 
Technology Framework Program 6 (IST-FP6). The major part of the relevant projects belongs to a specific area: 
“Towards a global dependability and security framework” under this program as it is illustrated in [20]. 
 
                                                 
1  Description of the projects is based on information from European Community Research and Development Information 
Service (CORDIS). CORDIS usually provides very long web links to the projects’ descriptions. Therefore in order to find the projects 
description at CORDIS, the readers are advised to search on http://cordis.europa.eu/search using a project’s acronym.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 Comparative time schedule for the European projects 
2.1 Generic projects, addressing general information security issues 
Security IST Projects cluster support (SECURIST) 
SecurIST was to deliver a Strategic Research Agenda for ICT Security and Dependability R&D for Europe. It 
identified priorities for Europe, mechanisms to effectively focus efforts on those priorities, and instruments for 
delivering on those priorities and a coherent time frame for delivery.  
Reference: http://www.ist-securist.org/ 
Analysis and Assessment for critical infrastructure protection (ACIP) 
The goal of ACIP was to determine how protection of critical infrastructures can be analysed and assessed by 
modelling and simulation (M&S) and to provide a roadmap for the development and application of modelling and 
simulation, gaming and further adequate methodologies and tools.  
References: http://www.iabg.de/acip/index.html 
Dependability Development Support Initiative (DDSI) 
The objective of DDSI was to support the development of dependability policies across Europe and across 
sectoral boundaries. It aims to establish networks of interest, to provide baseline data and to develop policy 
roadmaps. These products will support policy-supporting activities by European institutions and by public and 
private sector stakeholders across the EU, in Accession States and in partner nations including the USA. 
References: http://www.ddsi.org 
Management Decision Support for Critical Infrastructures (MEDSI) 
MEDSI was to develop a web-based integrated set of software services as a tool to enhance the capabilities of 
crisis planners and crisis managers in both private and governmental organizations. The system will be used by 
users from general security area, as well as, environmental protection, utilities management, airports and 
seaports, healthcare, transports, roads, energy plants, borders control etc.  
Reference: http://www.medsi.org 
Security of Software Services of Mobile Systems (S3MS) 
S3MS creates a framework and a technological solution for trusted deployment and execution of communicating 
mobile applications in heterogeneous environments. S3MS would enable the opening of the software market of 
nomadic devices (from smart phones to PDA) to trusted third party applications beyond the sandbox model, 
without the burden of roaming trust infrastructure but without compromising security and privacy requirements. 
Reference: http://www.s3ms.org  
 
Mobile Peer-to-Peer Security Infrastructure (PEPERS) 
PEPERS works on a reliable platform with high-level support for the design, development and operational 
deployment of secure mobile peer-to-peer applications for future AmI environments. The project will address 
issues related to security, privacy, trust and access control in mobile peer-to-peer (p2p) systems by proposing a 
relevant framework architecture.  
Reference: http://www.pepers.org/ 
European Security Forum for Web Services, Software and Systems (ESFORS) 
ESFORS is a Coordination Action that aims at bringing together the European stakeholders for security and 
dependability information and communication technologies to address the security and dependability 
requirements of emerging software service platforms. This emergence of open service platforms such as web 
services provides major opportunities to position the European software industry at the heart of the emerging 
information society.  
Reference: http://www.esfors.org/ 
Highly dependable ip-based Networks and services (HIDENETS) 
HIDENETS develops and analyses end-to-end resilience solutions for distributed applications and mobility-aware 
services in ubiquitous communication scenarios. The HIDENETS solutions are essential for the deployment of 
future applications: the use of off-the-shelf components and wireless communication links will dramatically 
decrease the costs of market entry and hence make such ubiquitous scenarios commercially feasible.  
Reference: http://www.hidenets.aau.dk/ 
 
Framework architecture to semantically integrate advanced threat detection and security protection at 
ultra-high speeds (FASTMATCH) 
The project works on an agent-oriented layered architecture to enable the delivery of multiple pattern-based and 
behaviour-based scanning and filtering functions at very high speeds. The objectives are to provide a framework 
for the concurrent operation of reactive and proactive security algorithms, to deliver algorithmic enhancements for 
pattern recognition and behaviour-based detection schemes and rule sets for more efficient alarm management 
and root-cause analysis. 
Reference: http://www.fastmatch.org/ 
Resilience for survivability in IST (ReSIST) 
ReSIST integrates research on Dependability, Security, and Human Factors in order to create a coherent set of 
research activities aimed at ensuring that future "ubiquitous computing systems" (the immense systems of ever-
evolving networks of computers and mobile devices which are needed to support and provide Ambient 
Intelligence (AmI)) will have the necessary resilience and survivability.  
Reference: http://www.laas.fr/RESIST/ 
 
2.2 Applied projects, addressing specific Critical Infrastructure Protection issues in Power sector 
Vital Infrastructure Threats and Assurance (VITA) 
The VITA project aimed at delivering assessment on the threats to and assurance and protection of highly 
networked infrastructures, most of which are operating trans-nationally, and disruption of which is critical to 
Europe’s security. The project has provided: methods to raise awareness on the need for vital infrastructure 
protection, an approach on methods, tools and technologies for the protection improvement and a demonstrator 
experiment by a scenario exercise with focus on energy. 
Reference: http://vita.iabg.eu/ 
Integrated Risk Reduction of Information-based Infrastructure Systems (IRRIIS) 
The extensive use of information and communication technologies has pervaded all infrastructures, making them 
increasingly interdependent and more vulnerable. IRRIIS analyses, models and simulates the dependencies 
between ICT-based infrastructures and provides appropriate middleware technology to increase dependability 
and resilience of ICT-based critical infrastructures. 
Reference: http://www.irriis.org/  
Critical Utility Infrastructure Resilience (CRUTIAL) 
CRUTIAL, CRitical UTility InfrastructurAL Resilience, addresses networked ICT systems for the management of 
the electric power grid, where control systems need to be connected with information infrastructures via Internet. 
The project approach resides in modelling interdependent infrastructures taking into account the multiple 
dimensions of interdependencies, and attempting at casting them into new architectural patterns, resilient to both 
accidental failures and malicious attacks.  
Reference:  http://crutial.cesiricerca.it/  
 
3 NATIONAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS  
3.1 Belgium 
Reaching for 100% Reliable Electricity Services: Multi-system Interactions and Fundamental Solutions 
(GOA) 
GOA is a national project, carried out at Katholieke University Leuven in Belgium and funded by the Research 
Council of the university. The project aims for a basic research study of the limits to reliable power supply, to 
fundamentally analyse shortcomings in today’s methods and tools, and to indicate ways for totally new and 
fundamental solutions for the future. 
URL: http://www.kuleuven.ac.be/research/researchdatabase/project/3E05/3E051043.htm 
3.2 Italy  
Ricerca di Sistema (RdS) 
RdS is an Italian Research Programme to perform research and development activities aimed to improve the 
economics, security and quality of the Italian electric system. The main objective is to devise solutions to practical 
problems, in view of the power system evolution and the scientific-technological progress, so as to sustain the 
changes dictated by international agreements (Kyoto). This Research Programme is structured in projects 
participated by the major research operators in the electrical field and academics, whose results are made public 
in form of reports or published papers (in Italian). More than 70 universities and research centres were involved in 
Italy and abroad. Until 2005 CESI (Centro Elettrotecnico Sperimentale Italiano) had been appointed to manage 
the funds assigned to the projects. 
The Programme covers a wide-scope area of research in power generation, transmission, distribution and final 
uses, renewable and dispersed energy sources, nuclear, hydrogen, grid development, power system control, 
power transmission technologies, power saving and quality. Specific activities focus on protection techniques for 
both accidental and intentional threats of different nature (environmental, atmospheric, physical, logical) and on 
reducing the environmental impact of power installations. Of specific interest for GRID are the projects presented 
in Table 1.  
Table 1 Overview of CIP related RdS projects 
Acronym 
 
Italian title  
 
English title Time-
frame 
EXTRA Sviluppi del mercato liberalizzato 
dell'energia elettrica in Italia e sua 
integrazione nel mercato elettrico 
Europeo 
Developments of the liberalised 
electric market in Italy and its 
integration in the European electric 
market 
2003-2005 
GENDIS 21 La generazione distribuita per il 
miglioramento della qualità del servizio 
elettrico e dell'ambiente 
The distributed generation for the 
improvement of the power quality 
service and of the environment 
2003-2005 
NORME Sviluppo di norme a sostegno delle Development of norms to support 2003-2005 
esigenze del sistema elettrico Nazionale the needs of the national electric 
system 
 RETE 21 Lo sviluppo e l'esercizio delle rete 
elettrica italiana nel XXI secolo 
The development and the operation 
of the Power Grid for the 21st 
Century 
2003-2005 
SENNA Sensoristica innovativa e nanomateriali 
per il sistema elettrico 
Innovative sensors and 
nanotechnologies for the power 
system 
2003-2005 
SISET Sicurezza degli impianti del sistema 
elettrico e interazione con il territorio 
Security of the power system plants 
and interaction with the 
environment 
2003-2005 
CATERINA Aumento della capacità di trasporto della 
rete 
Increasing the grid transport 
capacity 
2000-2003 
COMUNICA Comunicazione tra e nei sistemi elettrici Communication intra and inter 
electrical systems 
2000-2003 
ENTRADE Energy Trading: modelli e funzionamento 
dei mercati liberalizzati del'energia 
Energy trading: models and 
mechanisms of the liberalised 
markets 
2000-2003 
EVORE Evoluzione della rete elettrica Evolution of the electric power grid 2000-2003 
SICURE Funzionamento in sicurezza del sistema 
elettrico 
Secure operation of the electric 
system 
2000-2003 
SISIGEN Sicurezza del sistema elettrico Electrical system security 2000-2003 
Reference:  http://www.ricercadisistema.it/ 
3.3 Norway 
Protection of the Society / Beskyttelse av Samfunnet (BAS)  
The project [16] focused on vulnerability of the national power system in the perspective of the more serious 
threats as intentional man-made attacks and natural disasters in a national security context. Based on results of 
the study, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) recommended a minimum package of 
measures, emphasising ICT security, increased ability to re-establish power supply after outages, robustness of 
important objects and nodes, emergency planning and training. As a result of the study, the Norwegian Defence 
Research Establishment (FFI) recommended a minimum package of measures with emphasis on: 
• Information and communication technology security 
• Increased ability to re-establish power supply after outages 
• Robustness of important objects and nodes 
• Emergency planning and training 
 
It was also pointed out that the production margins in the power supply system must increase with needs for 
investments in new constructions, import capacity and energy saving measure. However, new constructions in 
power plants and lines are not an easy task in the modern Norway, with a lot of challenges from the pure cost to 
environmental issues. 
Reference: http://www.nve.no/modules/module_109/publisher_view_product.asp?iEntityId=5782 
Vulnerability of the Nordic Power System 
This study was funded by the Nordic Council of Ministers and carried on by SINTEF Energy Research in 2003 . 
The main objective of the study was to: 
• Identify incidents, situations and scenarios leading to critical or serious consequences to the society and the 
power system 
• Identify barriers to handle and reduce the vulnerability 
• Identify possible countermeasures and actions to handle and reduce the vulnerability 
 
The Results of the study are presented in the final report [18] and in its executive summary [19]. 
3.4 USA 
GridWise™ Alliance 
The GridWise Alliance is a consortium of public and private stakeholders who are aligned around a shared vision 
of an electric system that integrates the infrastructure, processes, devices, information and market structure so 
that energy can be generated, distributed, and consumed more efficiently and cost effectively; thereby achieving a 
more resilient, secure and reliable energy system. The Alliance provides a forum where members representing a 
broad range of interests in the electricity sector can meet, exchange ideas, and work cooperatively on a common 
set of issues, with the goal of moving our industrial-age electric grid into the information age. In addition, the 
Alliance provides its members with opportunities to interact with senior policy makers on both the US federal and 
state level. In their 2004 Memorandum of Understanding, the GridWise Alliance and the U.S. Department of 
Energy agreed to work together to realize the vision of a transformed national electricity grid. 
URL: http://www.gridwise.org/ 
Team for Research in Ubiquitous Secure Technology (TRUST)  
The Team for Research in Ubiquitous Secure Technology (TRUST) is a partnership between industry and 
academia devoted to the development of a new science and technology that will radically transform the ability of 
organizations (software vendors, operators, local and federal agencies) to design, build, and operate trustworthy 
information systems for their critical infrastructures. The major technical goal of TRUST is composition and 
computer security for component technologies. The role of the testbeds will be to integrate and evaluate 
technologies in specific and realistic systems, keep the research on track to answer societal objectives, and 
demonstrate the technologies for stakeholders in real systems.  
Reference:  http://trust.eecs.berkeley.edu 
Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid (TCIP) 
The TCIP NSF Cyber Trust Centre was created in August 2005 to address the challenge of how to protect the US 
power grid. The National Science Foundation (NSF) awarded $7.5 million over five years to the project, which will 
be led by the University of Illinois ITI team and also involve researchers at Cornell University, Dartmouth College, 
and Washington State University. The centre’s intention is to improve significantly the way the power grid cyber 
infrastructure is built, making it more secure, reliable, and safe. TCIP is working to provide the fundamental 
science and technology needed to create an intelligent, adaptive power grid that can survive malicious 
adversaries, provide continuous delivery of power, and support dynamically varying trust requirements. The 
centre creates the necessary cyber building blocks and architecture, and by creating validation technology, 
quantifies the amount of trust provided by the proposed approach. 
Reference:  http://www.iti.uiuc.edu/tcip/ 
 
4 STANDARDS RELATED TO THE SECURITY OF CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Most of the technologies used for control systems have shifted towards the adoption of off-the-shelf components 
used in general-purpose computation and communication: while taking advantage of the technical possibilities 
provided by the new ICT, power systems have inherited dangerous vulnerabilities. The benefits deriving from the 
adoption of standardized technologies accelerate the implementation of control systems and related 
communications without any guarantee of secure operation. Vulnerabilities due to design and technology flaws 
may be exploited by malicious antagonist actors, who can gain access to the systems through external and 
internal connections. These threats menace industry in the whole energy industrial spectrum, as their supervisory 
control and data acquisition systems (SCADA for short) are based on similar technologies and are deployed using 
analogous architectures. Standards might help in the protection of SCADA in different ways: 
• Helping in setting a common conceptual basis between all stakeholders: operators, vendors, certifiers, 
authorities, etc. 
• Supporting all engineering processes: from specification to procurement, and from operation to 
maintenance. 
• Fostering the development of a market for security products and services, with verifiable levels of 
assurance. 
Furthermore, there is a virtuous circle involving research, innovation and standardization processes: 
• Research results are taken up by innovative products to be introduced in the market place; 
• Innovation is fostered by standardization: the more standard approaches exist to secure product 
deployment, the faster is innovation take-up in the market place – i.e. technology deployment. 
Standardization processes by their nature involve a uniformed knowledge management approach which clarifies 
needs, problems, issues, methodologies. Every standardization effort must starts with a glossary. But this helps to 
motivate and set the base for further research, oriented to solve the issues that knowledge management pointed 
out. 
However, there is a time gap between the availability of standards and their application. Current efforts to 
consider security in SCADA standards are too recent for being sure about their effectiveness. In the meantime 
critical infrastructures and the process industry continue deploying SCADA systems. The situation is challenging, 
and by all accounts will continue to be so for the next decade – if not more. Industry is already waiting for 
standards that will not be ready in the next coming years. In the meantime information and communication 
technologies are being deployed with an ad-hoc approach to security, based on the restricted knowledge of each 
company.  
According to a recent survey [21] several attempts exist to introduce cyber security standards in the SCADA 
sector. All main standard associations and stakeholder organizations appear to be involved, including ISO, NIST, 
IEC, NERC, CIGRE’, API and AGA [ibidem]. 
In the following we focus on two approaches which appear to be centered on the power sector. Both are 
developed within IEC, the International Electrotechnical Commission. IEC [http://www.iec.ch/] is a standards 
organization that prepares and publishes international standards for all electrical, electronic, and related 
technologies. These standards serve as a basis for creating national standards and as references for drafting 
international tenders and contracts. IEC’s members include manufacturers, providers, distributors, vendors, 
consumers, users, all levels of governmental agencies, professional societies, trade associations, and standards 
developers from over 60 countries.  
In 2004 the IEC Technical Sub-Committee 65C (Industrial Process Measurement and Control – Digital 
Communications), through its working group WG13 (Cyber Security), started to address security issues - within 
the IEC 61784 standard – for field buses and other industrial communication networks. Results of this work are 
outlined in part 4, entitled “Digital data communications for measurement and control – Profiles for secure 
communications in industrial networks”.  
The working group WG10 of the IEC Technical Sub-Committee 65A is working to extend this field level 
communication to address security standards across common automation networking scenarios. The standard 
being drafted as a result of this work is IEC 62443, entitled “Security for industrial process measurement and 
control – Network and system security”. It is based on a modular security architecture consisting of requirement 
sets. These modules are mapped into ICS component and network architecture. The resulting requirements can 
then be formulated for use as the basis for Requests for Proposals for data communication standards, and 
security audits.  
The IEC Technical Committee 57, focused on Power Systems Management and Associated Information 
Exchange, set up the working group WG15 - Data and communication security specifically devoted to the 
development of security standards for power system communication protocols defined by the other WGs of TC57 
covering the telecontrol protocols, power line communications, power system IED communications, deregulated 
energy market communications, communication systems for distributed energy resources, hydroelectric power 
plants communications. Hence this effort appears more focused in scope on the power sector, while TC 65 A 
addresses all process sectors, and shows remarkable differences with respect to the previous one. 
In conclusion, current standardization efforts concerning SCADA security appear to converge. The Process 
Control Systems Forum [https://www.pcsforum.org/] has established a common vocabulary and all current efforts, 
including IEC, CIGRE', ISA and AGA, are now converging towards that common set of definitions.  The IEC TC 
65 – WG 10 is leading together with the ISA SP-99, but it is likely that these latter will limit themselves in the 
future to issuing guidelines, leaving proper standardisation to the IEC  TC 65 – WG 10. The time range to achieve 
a comprehensive cyber security standard about SCADA should be 3-5 years.  
Divergence of some efforts (most remarkably TC 57) can be explained by the different - more peculiar - scope 
and mission. These two factors account for most of the differences a particular standard will add – e.g., in form of 
a qualifying language to a definition - to place particular emphasis on their scope of work.  Specifically, WG 15 of 
TC 57 has a unique problem, in that they have to amend for cyber security specific communication protocols 
established quite long time ago, by 1995-96, and have to adapt to the original vision and terminology of the 
foundational documents. In conclusion, TC 57 is looking to more specific issues, peculiar of the electric power 
system sector.  And cyber security requirements for some Transmission & Distribution equipment (e.g. Wide Area 
Monitoring and Protection) are far more stringent than the ones regarding SCADA in general. 
 
5 POSITIONING OF CURRENT EFFORTS ON THE GRID ROAD MAP 
In the following Tables the objectives defined by the GRID Road Map (left side) are matched with the objectives of 
the projects overviewed in chapters 3 and 4. A different colour identifies European, national and US projects. 
 
Table 2 – Project positioning against GRID objectives in the Risk Assessment area 
 
Risk & Vulnerability Assessment  
Near Term (0-3 years): Initial studies 
Identification/understanding of 
the classes, categories and 
characteristics of risks and 
vulnerabilities (present and 
forecasted) 
SECURIST 
– Establish and co-ordinate a European ICT Security & 
Dependability Taskforce  
– Drive the creation of an "ICT Security & Dependability 
Research strategy beyond 2010"  
– Leverage the knowledge base of existing/future ICT Security 
and Dependability researchers and projects 
MEDSI 
– Integration of Geographical Information Systems with DB, 
decision-support management and an auditory system to 
develop an advanced system that will be able to give support 
on decisions in a crisis 
FASTMATCH 
– Threat source identification and localization 
– Security management architectures to model and implement 
an intelligent intrusion detection system 
VITA  
– (Analyse) threat of Critical Infrastructures in Europe by natural 
disasters, manmade disasters and technical incidents 
 Vulnerability of the Nordic Power System 
- Identify incidents, situations and scenarios leading to critical or 
serious consequences to the society and the power system 
- Identify barriers to handle and reduce the vulnerability 
- Identify possible countermeasures and actions to handle and 
reduce the vulnerability 
 
Beskyttelse av Samfunnet (BAS) 
– vulnerability of the national power system in the perspective of 
the more serious threats as intentional man-made attacks and 
natural disasters in a national security context 
Common methodologies for 
risk assessment and 
vulnerability analyses of 
integrated Power and ICT 
systems  
Vulnerability of the Nordic Power System 
- Identify incidents, situations and scenarios leading to critical or 
serious consequences to the society and the power system 
- Identify barriers to handle and reduce the vulnerability 
- Identify possible countermeasures and actions to handle and 
reduce the vulnerability 
 
Initial assessment of relevant 
methods and tools for risk and 
vulnerability analyses 
ACIP 
- How protection of critical infrastructures can be analysed by 
modelling and simulation  
- provide a roadmap for the development and application of 
modelling and simulation, gaming and further adequate 
methodologies and tools 
 
Mid Term (3-8 yrs) : Off line  assessment tools and technologies: planning and 
design 
 
Off-line tools for analyzing the 
risk and vulnerability related to 
different hazards and threats 
(technical, human errors, 
malicious attacks, weather 
related, etc) 
VITA  
– Protect such infrastructures via realistic scenario and crisis 
management simulation  
 
Assessment of defensive 
strategies and incident 
reporting  
 
 
Long Term (8-15 yrs): On line and Operational assessment 
 
Realization of operational tools 
for vulnerability assessment of 
components and systems, 
taking into account expected 
evolutions and scenarios  
 
 
 
Table 3 – Project positioning against GRID objectives in the Controls area 
 
Control Architectures and Technologies  
:  
Near Term (0-3 yrs):  Crosscutting issues 
 
Understanding 
interdependencies and 
cascading effects of ICT 
faults and scenarios 
 
ACIP 
- how protection of critical infrastructures can be analysed by 
modelling and simulation  
- provide a roadmap for the development and application of 
modelling and simulation, gaming and further adequate 
methodologies and tools 
IRRIIS 
- Determine a sound set of public and private sector 
requirements based upon detailed scenario and data 
analysis.  
 
ESFORS  
- Bring together the European stakeholders for security and 
dependability Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) to address the security and dependability requirements 
of emerging software service platforms 
 
MEDSI 
- Integration of Geographical Information Systems with DB, 
decision-support management and an auditory system to 
develop an advanced system that will be able to give support 
on decisions in a crisis  
VITA  
- (Analyse) threat of Critical Infrastructures in Europe by natural 
disasters, manmade disasters and technical incidents,  
 
CRUTIAL 
- Investigation of models and architectures that cope with the 
scenario of openness, heterogeneity and evolvability endured 
by electrical utilities infrastructures;  
- Analysis of critical scenarios in which faults in the information 
infrastructure provoke serious impacts on the controlled 
electric power infrastructure; 
- Investigation of distributed architectures enabling dependable 
control and management of the power grid.  
 
Mid Term (3-8 yrs):  Components and architectures 
 
Flexible architectures 
needed to mitigate cascading 
effects among ICT 
infrastructures and power 
systems  
 
 
CRUTIAL 
- Investigation of distributed architectures enabling dependable 
control and management of the power grid. 
IRRIIS 
- Develop MIT (Middleware Improved Technology), a collection 
of software components, which facilitates IT-based 
communication between different infrastructures and different 
infrastructure providers 
- Build SimCIP (Simulation for Critical Infrastructure Protection), 
a simulation environment for controlled experimentation with a 
special focus on CIs interdependencies 
 
Identification of transition 
steps toward more robust 
systems 
 
Assurance of the power 
infrastructure: security 
policies (procedures, 
protection, etc.) in the 
context of defence plans, 
communication of security 
risk, assurance cases 
RETE21  
– development and operation of the Power Grid for the 21st 
Century 
 
Long Term (8-15 yrs):  protective measures, remedial actions and real time 
applications  
 
Real time applications for 
supervision & control 
encompassing EMS & ICT 
functions 
 
Strategies for decentralized 
intelligence 
 
Self reconfiguring 
architectures and protection 
mechanisms 
 
 
Implementation, testing and 
performance evaluation of 
the introduced and 
incremental new control 
concepts 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – Project positioning against GRID objectives in the Awareness and Governance of Risk in 
Socioety area 
 
Awareness and Governance of Risk in Society 
: 
 Near Term (0-3 yrs): Awareness Raising and Education 
 
Awareness raising campaign 
for business and policy 
decision makers and 
practitioners 
VITA  
- Increase the awareness and a sense of urgency on the need 
for CIP capabilities 
ESFORS  
- Bring together the European stakeholders for security and 
dependability Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) to address the security and dependability requirements 
of emerging software service platforms 
DDSI 
- Establishing networks of interest among the leading European 
and international stakeholders (European institutions, national 
governments, industry and civil society) 
- Providing baseline data about dependability initiatives around 
the world 
- Preparing policy roadmaps targeted at industry, national 
governments and European institutions 
GridWise™ Alliance  
- It is a consortium of public and private stakeholders who are 
aligned around a shared vision. A vision of an electric system 
that integrates the infrastructure, processes, devices, 
information and market structure so that energy can be 
generated, distributed, and consumed more efficiently and 
cost effectively; thereby achieving a more resilient, secure 
and reliable energy system. 
Establish training curricula, 
programs and tools for risk 
assessment including 
professional education 
 
Proposal of security risk 
governance arrangement for 
the European power 
infrastructure 
 
 
Mid Term (3-8 yrs): Actions on Society and Organisations  
 
EU training programme for 
Power Engineers on security 
risk 
 
Consensus on Security Risk 
management & governance 
structures 
 
First set of EU security 
laboratories 
TRUST:  
- Analysis, design and deployment of trusted systems. 
TRUST’s Research programme encompasses: 
- Security technology 
- System science  
- Social science 
- Testbeds 
 
TCIP  
- Research plan is focused on securing the low-level devices, 
communications, and data systems that make up the power 
grid, to ensure trustworthy operation during normal conditions, 
cyber-attacks, and/or power emergencies. 
Acceptance of standards for 
secure data exchange & 
communication  
IEC TC 57 & 65 
- Standardisation efforts in the process control and the power 
sectors 
 
Long Term (8-15 years): Deploy EU-wide security programme 
 
EU wide training facilities for 
power engineers 
 
 
 
3 CONCLUSIONS 
Among those considered in this review, the US-Canada Road Map is the closer in scope to the GRID one. 
However there are important differences between the two Road Maps – chiefly related to sponsorship and aim. 
These points basically explain the other differences related to participants, scope and timeframe. While the USCR 
is directly sponsored by the US and Canada governments in a joint effort, GRID is partly funded by the 
Commission through the EU framework. The USCR is a collaborative work between industry and government with 
active involvement and leadership of energy asset owners and operators, while GRID is lead by its research 
partners, and performs consultation actions toward the industry - stakeholders are directly involved in an advisory 
role only. The USCR is aimed at improving cyber security through a coherent plan to be used by industry and 
government as a template for action, while GRID is aimed at improving cyber security through a research 
roadmap which by its nature may impact on cyber security in an indirect way and in a longer term. By 
consequence, the USCR covers the whole energy sector and includes activities of testing, best practices, training 
and education, policies, standards and protocols, information sharing in addition to R&D, while GRID covers the 
electricity domain only, and mostly focuses on R&D in longer term timescales.  
Concerning CI2RCO, its findings and recommendations are a valuable background for GRID and many of the 
general results of CI2RCO can be supported from the in-depth experience in the closer GRID sector, but in 
practice there is little overlapping. The same can be predicated for most of the generic EU projects quoted in 
Tables 3, 4 and 5, while power sector specific projects, like CRUTIAL, IRRIIS and VITA may contribute insight in 
the requirements analysis phase and specific solutions for control architectures and tools.  
The other important EU Road Mapping efforts in the power sector partly funded in the EU framework, SmartGrids, 
RELIANCE and ERMInE, have a similar constituency (they are all Coordination Actions among stakeholders) but 
a far broader scope than GRID: 
- SmartGrids is aimed at providing a Road Map for R&D concerning (mostly) electricity distribution and in 
longer term horizon (2030) than GRID. Several research themes may be concerned by the GRID Road 
Map; 
- RELIANCE provides coordination on R&D among TSOs. It also focuses on improved cyber security, but 
did not elaborate a specific Road Map on this theme. 
- ERMInE aims at collecting data about the present situation of electricity RTD in Europe and a Roadmap – 
defined as the potential evolution of the electricity sector in Europe.  
Over time, a working relationship has been established with the three actions above, hence the GRID Road Map 
is expected to be taken as an input by those actions, and influence their outcome in the relevant areas. 
Concerning the GRID Roadmap’s objectives presented in chapter 5, it is apparent that, while a good number of 
the censed projects address short-term objectives considered by GRID, most medium term objectives are not 
addressed. Among them it is especially worth noticing: 
- Assessment of defensive strategies and incident reporting (Risk Assessment) 
- Identification of transition steps toward more robust systems (Control Architectures & Technologies) 
Finally, it is worth noticing that most short- and medium-term objectives considered within the area Awareness 
and Governance of Risk in Society are not addressed at all – unless by US projects, namely: 
- Establish training curricula, programs and tools for risk assessment including professional education  
- (proposal of) security risk governance arrangement for the European power infrastructure 
- First set of EU security laboratories 
- Acceptance of standards for secure data exchange & communication 
Hence focus of security relevant research concerning power systems need to be moved towards the above 
objectives. 
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